

J W6429  
 AMERICAN AGGRESSORS WERE DULY PUNISHED  
 VIETNAM, NORTH  
 MILITARY OPERATIONS/COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
 NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMY  
 1964 S 16 SD BW CONF. 29 MIN.  
 VIETNAMESE TRACK. FOLLOWING CONFERENCES  
 BETWEEN U.S. OFFICIALS & KHANK GOVERNMENT,  
 U.S. DESTROYER "MADDOX" ENGAGES PATROL  
 BOATS ON 1 & 4 AUGUST 1964. WAVES OF JET  
 PLANES ATTACK VARIOUS NORTH VIETNAMESE  
 TARGETS, 5 AUGUST. BRAVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT  
 UNITS ON LAND & SEA FIGHT OFF ATTACKERS,  
 DOWNING EIGHT PLANES & CAPTURING ONE  
 PILOT, ALVAREZ. DIVERS, FROGMEN, FISHER-  
 MEN SALVAGE PLANE PARTS WHICH FORM EXTEN-  
 SIVE DISPLAY IN HANOI. NORTH VIETNAMESE  
 INSPECT PILOTS' EFFECTS, ROCKET POD &  
 MATCHING AMMUNITION, EQUIPMENT OF VARIOUS  
 KINDS. HO CHI MINH, VO NGUYEN GIAP, PHAM  
 VAN DONG SPEAK AT RALLY. MASSIVE STREET  
 DEMONSTRATIONS, MATCHED BY INDIGATION  
 RALLIES, PETITIONS, PARADES IN PEKING,  
 TOKYO, HANOI & MANY OTHER CITIES, CONDEMN  
 U.S. ACTIONS, CONFIDENT OF WORLD SUPPORT,  
 NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTINUE WAR EFFORT, DE-  
 TERMINED TO PUNISH AGGRESSORS.

J W6719  
 VIETNAM UNDER FIRE (HI-NO-VIETNAM) -  
 CHALLENGING THE AGGRESSOR  
 VIETNAM, NORTH  
 AREA STUDY/MILITARY OPERATIONS PROPAGANDA  
 JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY  
 1966 S 16 SD BW CONF. 30 MIN.  
 JAPANESE TRACK. [ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
 AVAILABLE]. AS U.S. ESCALATES WAR IN  
 VIETNAM, HER TROOPS KILL, TORTURE, BURN,  
 USE NAPALM, EVEN POISON GAS. LIBERATION  
 FRONT FIGHTERS COUNTER U.S. MOVES, IN-  
 FLICT HEAVY LOSSES. U.S. SECRETARY OF  
 DEFENSE MCNAMARA COMES TO SAIGON TO  
 ESCALATE WAR STILL FURTHER. INSPIRED BY  
 EXECUTION OF NGUYEN VAN TROI IN 1964,  
 LIBERATION FRONT FIGHTS 80,000 ENGAGE-  
 MENTS, LIQUIDATES 400,000 SOLDIERS IN-  
 CLUDING 3,000 AMERICANS. U.S. ATTACKS  
 NORTH, BOMBS VILLAGES, HOMES, HOSPITALS,  
 SCHOOLS. NORTH VIETNAMESE COMPLAINTS TO  
 INTERNATIONAL WATCH COMMITTEE PROVE  
 FRUITLESS. LETTER FROM SOLDIER ON  
 LONELY OUTPOST TYPES RESOLUTION OF  
 PEOPLE LED BY HO, WHO VISITS ANTI-AIR-  
 CRAFT UNITS. SAM MISSILES HELP IN FIGHT.  
 NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT & NORTH VIET-  
 NAMESE SHARE COMMON BATTLE OBJECTIVES.

J W6432  
 AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE TO DIE IF THEY DO  
 NOT QUIT  
 VIETNAM, NORTH  
 COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
 NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMY  
 1965 S 16 SD BW CONF. 17 MIN.  
 VIETNAMESE TRACK. EVERYONE JOINS IN AIR  
 DEFENSE IN NORTH VIETNAM. PEOPLE OF ALL  
 AGES HELP SOLDIERS IMPROVE & CAMOUFLAGE  
 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN POSITIONS, TRANSPORT  
 AMMUNITION, DIG PROTECTIVE DITCHES &  
 TUNNELS. U.S. BOMBING OF SCHOOLS &  
 HOSPITALS INCENSES EVERYONE. SOME BOMBS  
 & ROCKETS KILL PIGS & OTHER LIVESTOCK.  
 INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED PILOTS LIKE  
 LOCKHART CONFIRMS U.S. INTENTIONS. IN  
 THEIR ANGER, PEOPLE PREPARE DEMONSTRAT-  
 TIONS, HEAR SPEECHES BY PROMINENT NORTH  
 VIETNAMESE. WESTERNERS ATTEND PRESS CON-  
 FERENCE WHERE EFFECTS OF CAPTURED PILOTS  
 APPEAR AS EVIDENCE OF U.S. ACTIONS. ANTI-  
 AIRCRAFT UNIT HEROES RECEIVE DECORATIONS  
 & SPECIAL FLAG FROM HO CHI MINH. EVERYONE  
 HELPS IN FINDING & DEACTIVATING DUD BOMBS  
 & ROCKETS.

SMITH

J W6793  
 VIETNAM WILL WIN THIS WAR  
 VIETNAM, SOUTH  
 AREA STUDY/COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
 JAPAN-VIETNAM FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY  
 1966 S 16 SD BW CONF. 30 MIN.  
 JAPANESE TRACK. [PICTURE QUALITY POOR].  
 SINCE U.S. NOW USES JAPAN AS BASE FOR  
 AGGRESSION, JAPANESE MAY WELL ASK WHAT'S  
 HAPPENING IN SOUTH VIETNAM. NLF GAINS  
 CONTROL OF 80% OF SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE  
 1960. FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY PREVAILS IN  
 LIBERATED AREAS. NLF'S STRUGGLE FURNISHES  
 INCENTIVE TO PEOPLE IN NON-LIBERATED  
 AREAS. PEOPLE IN LIBERATED AREAS CARRY  
 OUT NORMAL PATTERNS OF LIFE. CHILDREN  
 ATTEND SCHOOL. RICE-PLANTING, FISHING,  
 SALT-MAKING, HANDICRAFT, INDEED ALL  
 EFFORTS, CHANNEL INTO SUPPORT FOR WAR.  
 VIET-CONG FIGHTERS TAKE STRATEGIC  
 VILLAGES WHICH PEOPLE DESTROY TO REBUILD.  
 ELECTIONS ARE HELD, VOLUNTEERS ENLIST.  
 MCNAMARA & WESTMORELAND MEET, ESCALATE  
 WAR, CLAIM U.S. PROTECTS DEMOCRACY  
 ALTHOUGH EVERY SOUTH VIETNAMESE KNOWS  
 THEY BUILD MILITARY EMPIRE. NLF SUCCESES  
 ASSURE EVENTUAL TRIUMPH WHICH INTER-  
 NATIONAL SUPPORT, EVEN IN U.S. ALSO  
 AFFIRMS.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <input type="text"/>		13 March 1968
ROOM NO. 6D0109	BUILDING Hdqrs.	
REMARKS:  <i>File HCUA</i>		
FROM: <input type="text"/>		<i>2 AB</i>
ROOM NO. 6D0109	BUILDING Hd	EXTENSION <input type="text"/>

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FORM NO. 241  
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REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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feel sorry for him. But in the very next scene he is back to his pursuit. With renewed *éclat*, tracking down a still greater Mafia figure with a still more compelling ingenuity and force, and thereby eliciting a sense of excitement which obliterates any possibility of revulsion or disapproval.

Even the cinematography contributes to this impression; the color is so lush, the range of settings so varied, the sound so resonant, that the reality of splintered bones, crushed testicles, and gushing blood is fairly well obscured.

BOTH FILMS REFLECT the new American ethic: an ethic of aesthetics. It is an ethic that celebrates Stokely Carmichael, William F. Buckley, and Murf the Surf—purveyors all of values that few rational people would share—because of the flair with which they project these values, while it condemns figures with the same values but much less flair, like Rap Brown, George Wallace, and Frank Costello. More than sim-

# NOTEBOOK

or through their respective organizations at home.

Extremely little, if anything, that is new or significant emerged from the meeting. My own opposition to the American war in Vietnam continues to be as complete as it had been before—I still see no viable alternative to a victory of the Vietnamese Communists (all other possible alternatives having been polarized out of existence by the ruthless American war) and prefer it immeasurably to the brutal American policy now being pursued. All this, however, not because of what I witnessed in Bratislava but *despite* it.

Apart from the original organizers, the American contingent consisted in about equal measure of a few religious radicals from the American Friends' Service Committee (AFSC), other Quakers, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and one or two off-beat clergymen; young academicians; representatives of the Black Power movement; young community organizers and student organizers of the New Left; a few writers, most of them associated with Left periodicals. This group, in which there were very few trained political technicians or Vietnam experts, was confronted by two Vietnamese delegations who had brought along their own experts in all areas under discussion and their own translators. It soon became clear that the Vietnamese were from very high echelons. At least one of them mentioned in passing that he had been a member of the Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Convention in 1954; all spoke with governmental authority. They were highly disciplined and in their way very competent.

The contrast between the two groups was striking. The Americans represented small factions—in some respects at odds with one another—of a movement on the outermost periphery of American society—whereas the Vietnamese were representatives of an effective government in one area and of a para-government in another.

The first day of the conference was set aside for reports from the Americans about the struggle against the war and the conditions for social revolution in this country; the second day for reports from South Vietnam; the third for North Vietnam; the fourth for the Chinese group discussions about special aspects of the

Vietnam situation. The American reports were multitudinous, relatively brief, mostly extemporaneous, quite subjective, and sometimes in conflict with one another. The Vietnamese reports were well-prepared. Each subject was assigned to a single expert. These reports were often written out and mimeographed beforehand and extremely lengthy. (Madame Binh, head of the South Vietnamese delegation, took all of one afternoon and most of the next morning for her opening statement.) They were clearly formulated as quasi-official, diplomatic documents.

YET OUT OF THESE QUASI-OFFICIAL reports no "hard news" whatever emerged. Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing that I had not known beforehand. It was, furthermore, absolutely impossible, even in private conversation, to break through the official propaganda line to which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was especially annoying since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause of their Vietnamese counterparts—and yet they were addressed as if they had to be indoctrinated from scratch with the crudest tools of persuasion. Two evenings, for example, were set aside for a series of North and South Vietnamese propaganda films that might be effective with Asian or African peasants but surely could not be expected to be persuasive with an even slightly sophisticated group.

Along with some AFSC and FOR people, I spent a long afternoon with the official Buddhist representative of the NLF. We plied him with questions about religious and cultural trends in his country, "third force" personalities known to us, and the facts concerning religious groups in his organization. It was, however, entirely impossible to come to grips with such problems: he insisted, first, on giving us what was in effect a two-hour filibuster, reviewing rudimentary knowledge and views obviously perfectly familiar to us. Anything that did not fit into his picture was either disregarded, condemned as treason and called untypical of the Vietnamese people, or treated as still an open question. The Front had ruled upon it.

# NOTEBOOK

In Approved For Release 2004/02/09 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200140035-3  
 titude of this gentleman and that of the head of the North Vietnamese lawyers' guild toward the Roman Catholic church. It is perfectly obvious that the church is virtually identified with the American cause in Vietnam. To admit this, however, would be tantamount to a contradiction of the official propaganda line that "all of the Vietnamese people" are arraigned with the NLF and that theirs is a "neutral, popular front." I could not, therefore, extract an anti-Roman-Catholic opinion from either of them. Indeed, the Buddhist representative insisted that a Roman Catholic priest, whom he named, was a member of the NLF Central Committee.

"Is he recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he has been ordained by a bishop and officiates at a church." "Is he still recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he still says mass." "Is his saying of mass still recognized by official Roman Catholic authorities as licit?" "Well"—this after half-an-hour's involved, translated give-and-take—"the priest is right now temporarily not recognized by the Vatican."

Several sessions were devoted to explore possibilities of dissuading Americans from participating in the war. The prominent role of black men in the army was discussed. One of the American blacks asked the relevant question: how many black soldiers had defected to the NLF? It took a long time to explain that question. Finally, the answer came forth that all the Vietnamese present were from the North and that they, therefore, did not have such information. "Could we ask some people from the NLF?" "Yes, they'll come in the afternoon."

In the afternoon again much time was spent in making the question clear. Ultimately, of course, it had to be conceded that there was no record of American defections, black or white. (On the other hand, the numbers of South Vietnamese defectors are, of course, vast—to the point where the NLF people claim, with considerable credibility, that they train some of their officers by letting them be inducted into Ky's army and having them instructed under U.S. auspices.)

AS FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the situation in that country, even as revealed during such a visit of little more than a week, struck me as much

descriptions we have been getting in the press. At the very beginning I had heard a few of the Americans express relief at finally being in a "socialist" country and no volunteered critical observations. I feared, therefore, that this representation of the New Left was buying the Czech party line completely. As the week drew on, however, my initial fear turned out to be unjustified. With no exception that I know of, the Americans became aware of the mindless and repressive society in which we found ourselves. At least within the confines of the American caucus, phrases such as "fascist," "paranoiac," "get out of here with my life," "totalitarian," etc. became quite frequent. Yet, to my knowledge at least, no one but myself confronted any Czech with articulated criticism.

There was, however a considerable amount of nonverbal criticism. At first, the Czechs tried to keep us together in supervised places. But American, or New Left, anarchy soon took over. Many of us dispersed through Bratislava in so many directions at the same time that it would have been extremely difficult to keep track of all of us. A black man, a minister, and a student actually conducted a flower-power demonstration off the central square of the city. Still, in discussing possible future press relations, the Americans stressed that one should mute one's criticism of the Czechs in order to prevent undesirable consequences for the Vietnamese and for future American-Vietnamese contacts—a rather eloquent expression of the stance of New Left people toward Communists.

This is precisely the main point about the encounter between the New Left and the real Communists in power. The question whether criticism of the Vietnamese should be muted never came up. It was apparently assumed that there was none. Certainly, none was expressed. The unspoken premise was that the Vietnamese were effectively fighting America as it is—and "*pas d'ennemies à la gauche combattante*." *Newsweek* quoted an anonymous reporter for *Ramparts* as having heard Tom Hayden exclaim: "Now we're all Vietcong."

I did not hear such an announcement—but this certainly was the mood of the gathering.

There were some nasty manifestations of this

total identification with the Vietnamese Communists. The NLF military expert gave a long presentation of the situation in the field as he saw it and some of the informal and quite brutal guerrilla tactics that had to be used in combating the American aggressors. (This had, the previous evening, been illustrated in one of the propaganda films.) The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made it my business not to look at the speaker but to study the American listeners. I am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained straight faces, there was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about this afterwards.

The American reaction to the Vietnamese ranged all the way from calculated political "popular frontism" to naive to wilfully blind to literally sick to craven. There were, no doubt, some who actually had no idea of what a Communist is. There were surely some who did not want to know and regarded every enemy of American imperialism as a comrade. They inclined, thus, to interpret the new NLF program as if it were an "agrarian reform" document. There was certainly a representation of the sick, who outraged one or the other Czech puritan Communist by talking, mostly in the language of "shit," about nonmarital sex relations and the abortions of girl friends. What most of the Americans had in common was the belief that anyone who batters the American Establishment effectively makes a contribution to the defeat of capitalist imperialism and he may not be criticized in any way, for fear of detracting from his effectiveness.

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conclusion: radicalism at this point can consist only of a radically realistic view of the utterly

hopeless situation in which we find ourselves: American capitalist imperialism is flooding much of the world with blood and vulgarity, while neither "coalition politics," nor "old-style socialism," nor the New Left have any relationship to the real world or hold out any hope for political effectiveness—and "the socialist blocs" not only exhibit no significant regaining of humane or humanist values but are, in fact, widening the destructive circle. Still, because this is the only way we know to be human, we try to embody and to advocate radically libertarian social ideals.

Lincoln Wolfenstein

### **The Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer**

ON FEBRUARY 18, 1967, the life of J. Robert Oppenheimer came to an end. Its history, probed with such agonizing detail in the 1954 AEC Security Board Hearings,<sup>1</sup> dramatizes the dilemma of the American scientist in the twentieth century.

To appreciate this history, we must have a view of Oppenheimer (or Opje, as he was called) before World War II, in those days before the scientists knew sin. There is no disagreement among the many observers: Opje was a brilliant analytical thinker, an intellectual with a striking variety of interests, and a natural leader of men. "... my admiration for his intelligence," writes Haakon Chevalier, "his judgment, and his character had gradually led me to the conviction that a high destiny awaited him."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," *Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, U.S. Government Printing Office* (1954).

<sup>2</sup> H. M. Chevalier, *Oppenheimer, the Story of a Friendship*, Pocket Books, p. 21 (1966). Chevalier, a close friend of Oppenheimer around 1940, was the central character of the "attempted espionage" incident that dominated much of the 1954 Hearings. While Chevalier's book must be read with knowledge of his intense bitterness toward Oppenheimer, it is a fascinating and instructive document.